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In this paper we consider a simple version of the neoclassical growth model, and carry
out an empirical analysis of the main determinants of aggregate investment across countries.
More speciﬁcally, we study the eﬀects on aggregate investment of income growth, capital in-
come shares, the relative price of capital, and various market distortions. This exercise also
sheds light into the shape of the neoclassical production function. We check these invest-
ment patterns for both OECD and non-OECD countries. We also decompose investment
data into equipment and structures, and explore major factors aﬀecting their relative prices.
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ment1 Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with the determinants of aggregate investment across countries.
We follow closely the analytical framework of the neoclassical growth model – a cornerstone in
studies of economic growth since the early work of Solow (1956). Various quantitative exercises
have singled out capital accumulation as a major factor in accounting for income levels [cf.
Barro (1999) and Hall and Jones (1999)]. There is, however, much more controversy about
the inﬂuence of some other forces [e.g., Caselli (2005) and McGrattan and Schmitz (1999)]
such as human capital and investments in technology adoption – which may aﬀect total factor
productivity (TFP). In most of this research the stock of physical capital is taken as given;
that is, physical capital is usually computed by a permanent inventory method using aggregate
investment data as a primitive element in the analysis. Here we want to delve into the ultimate
reasons underlying world investment patterns.
A basic tenet in the economic growth literature is that domestic investment rates seem
pretty constant across countries [cf. Summers and Heston (1991) and Hsieh and Klenow (2007)].
Another well-known empirical regularity (cf. opt. cit.) is that there is a pronounced variability
across countries in the relative price of capital which is inversely correlated with the income level.
Hence, when adjusting GDP data by a common set of prices, real investment rates are much
higher in rich countries. Therefore, rich countries display comparable nominal investment rates
that get translated into higher real investment rates. The eﬃciency of capital accumulation is
of course considered to be a major source of income disparity across countries.
In agreement with the data, the neoclassical growth model predicts that nominal investment
rates should be uncorrelated with income levels – provided that other fundamental forces stay
the same. Given the low variability of nominal investment rates across countries a key question
is whether or not taxes or some other factors matter for investment. The importance of these
other forces cannot be ruled out since there could be some countervailing eﬀects that make
countries experience similar nominal investment rates. Indeed, taxes are usually higher in OECD
countries, but non-OECD countries may endure more detrimental non-pecuniary distortions.
Furthermore, when decomposing investment data into equipment and structures we do not
see a strong correlation between these two sub-aggregates. There is substantial variation in
1the relative price of equipment across countries, but much less variation in the relative price
of structures. Then, more detailed data may unmask some other trends shaping these stable
investment patterns.
The behavior of investment rates and relative prices can shed light into the form of the neo-
classical production function. First, we ﬁnd weak evidence of additional external eﬀects coming
from human capital, public investment, and expenditures in R&D. Second, the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor is slightly less than one, and hence the Cobb-Douglas as-
sumption seems a good approximation. Third, by dividing aggregate investment into equipment
and structures we try to unveil complementarities with labor. If the Cobb-Douglas assumption
prevails, then capital income shares should be stable over time, and strongly correlated with
nominal investment rates. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that there is a weak correlation between in-
vestment rates and capital income shares across countries. This is the most puzzling fact that
works against the aggregate production function. As already pointed out there is also a weak
connection between expenditures in equipment and structures – which cannot just be attached
to the variability of the relative prices of equipment and structures. Hence, some other factors
outside the the simple version of the neoclassical growth model may also inﬂuence investment
such as the relative weights of the various sectors composing production, dynamic adjustment
costs, or time-to-build.
We then analyze the variability of the relative prices of equipment and structures. The
relative price of equipment displays much more variability than the relative price of structures.
Hence, aggregation of these two prices into a single index may not always be adequate. Early
studies [Jones (1994), De Long and Summers (1991) and Restuccia and Urrutia (2001)] focus on
the inﬂuence of relative prices and investment on economic growth. Again, we are just concerned
here with the ultimate determinants of relative prices. This may enhance our understanding of
the various channels through which factors of production may aﬀect either TPF or the eﬃciency
of capital accumulation. From our empirical analysis we ﬁnd that R&D investments may have
a weak inﬂuence on TFP but may impinge on the eﬃciency of capital accumulation. This
latter eﬀect may actually be more apparent for non-tradable investments. We also ﬁnd that the
Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (negative correlation of the price of capital with the income level) is
only present in the relative price of equipment. Likewise, human capital is only eﬀective to reduce
2the relative price of equipment. Investments in R&D, however, seem to aﬀect symmetrically
both prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out an extended version of the neoclassical
growth model in which the eﬃciency of investment can vary across countries. Section 3 considers
a balanced sample of 50 countries, and carries out an empirical implementation of this model.
In Section 4 we extend the original model to include two capital goods. This two-sector model
is then confronted with the data in Section 5. Section 6 performs an exploratory economet-
ric analysis of the relative prices of equipment and structures. Some concluding remarks are
gathered in Section 7.
2 The model with aggregate investment
This section puts forward a theoretical framework for assessing the determinants of investment
rates. The ﬁnal outcome of this exercise are three linear equations that will guide our empirical
investigation. To simplify matters, we assume that each country operates in a competitive-
markets setting of a closed economy with identical households that supply capital and labor.
To this simple version of the standard neoclassical growth model, we append a country-speciﬁc
relative price of capital and various types of taxes and non-pecuniary distortions. A two-sector
extension of this model will be deferred to Section 4.





where Ct is aggregate consumption, β is the discount factor, and u(Ct) is a standard utility
function. The production sector is represented by an aggregate technology as given by a C2
concave production function with aggregate capital and labor,
Yt = At(xt)F(Kt,BtLt). (2)
Here, Kt denotes the total stock of physical capital in the country, and At(xt) denotes the level
of TFP assumed to depend on a vector of variables xt. Vector xt gathers external eﬀects which
may come from physical capital and non-tangible investments (e.g., public capital, R&D, and
3human capital); for instance, see Aschauer (1989), Barro (1990) and Lucas (1988). Regarding
the labor input, Bt is the average level of education or productive skills, and Lt is the total
amount of workers in the economy. Hence, BtLt denotes the eﬀective units of labor in the
country. We will often refer to Bt as the average level of human capital, which grows according
to the law of motion Bt = B0(1 + gb)t for a constant growth rate gb > 0 over all dates t.
At all times, output in the economy may be either consumed or invested subject to physical
feasibility,
Yt = Ct + qtIt. (3)
The process qt represents the evolution of the price of investment in terms of the consumption
good. This relative price is governed by a deterministic law qt = q0(1 + gq)t for gq ≤ 0 and for
all t. Physical capital is subject to constant depreciation rate δ. Hence,
Kt+1 = It + (1 − δK)Kt. (4)
For convenience of the presentation, the various distortions aﬀecting this competitive econ-
omy are gathered in the sequence of budget constraints of the representative household:
(1 + τC)Ct + ϕqqt(1 + τI)It = (1 − τY )[(ϕRRt − δK)Kt + ϕwwt] + δKKt + Tt,all t ≥ 0 (5)
where Rt is the marginal productivity of physical capital and wt is the competitive wage. This
budget set incorporates ﬂat-rate taxes on consumption, τC, investment, τI, and income, τY . (Tax
proceeds are rebated back to the representative household as lump-sum transfers, Tt.) Further,
ϕR, ϕq, and ϕw represent some non-pecuniary costs inherent in the economic environment or
legal restrictions. For instance, ϕq could stand for some non-tangible costs over the price of
investment such as government permits, licenses, or property rights – the possibility of stealing
or losing the property.






(1 − τY )(ϕRRt+1 − δK) + δK
ϕqqt(1 + τI)
+ (1 + gq)(1 − δK).
Our analysis will be restricted to a stationary solution or balanced growth path where Ct
and Kt grow at constant rates. As is well known, the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP)





1−σ , σ > 0, and let Lt and qt remain constant. We could allow for negative
growth in q at the expense of a Cobb-Douglas production function, but we temporarily want to
explore the implications of a more general technology.
2.1 A CES technology
Let us assume a CES production function Yt = At(xt)[αK
ρ
t +(1−α)(BtL)ρ]1/ρ, for −∞ < ρ ≤ 1.
As is well known, ρ = 1 corresponds to a linear technology, the limiting case ρ → 0 corresponds
to a Cobb-Douglas production function, and ρ → −∞ corresponds to a Leontief technology.
Accordingly the elasticity of substitution between the two factors of production is 1
1−ρ.
Now, consider the income share of capital, γt = RtKt
Yt . Then, letting the rental rate R equal






Note that in the Cobb-Douglas case (ρ → 0) we obtain the well known result that γt = α;
in general, the capital income share is aﬀected by the capital-labor ratio. Along the BGP the












ϕqq0(1 + τI) − δK
(1 − τY )

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The nominal investment share is deﬁned as st = qtIt(1+τI)/Yt. Then, imposing the steady-
state condition I∗ = (δK + gb)K∗ from equation (4) and rearranging terms, we obtain
s∗ = (δK + gb)(1 + τI)γ∗ q0
R∗. (6)
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1In the case of a CES production function Rt = At(xt)α
h






5If the income tax τY does not allow for depreciation then this equation simpliﬁes to
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These last two equations summarize the quantitative eﬀects of distortions and other variables on
the nominal investment rate. Let us simply consider equation (8). Then, non-pecuniary frictions
ϕq and ϕR have the expected sign: An increase in the cost of investment (a higher ϕq) or a drop
in the marginal productivity of capital (a decline in ϕR) have negative eﬀects on the nominal
investment rate, s. Also, an increase in the income tax τY lowers s. Some other variables,
however, have ambiguous eﬀects on s depending on parameter ρ. Thus, if the technology is
close to linear, ρ > 0, then an increase in the investment tax, τI, or in the relative price q would
have a negative inﬂuence on s. The direction of causation reverses if the technology close to the
Leontief case, ρ < 0. The productivity term At(xt) also has ambiguous eﬀects albeit with the
opposite sign. It follows that τI, q, and A, fade out of the investment equation as we approach







β(1+n)−σ − (1 − δK)
i.
Finally, the labor market friction, ϕw, and the ﬂat-rate consumption tax, τC, remain neutral
in all the scenarios considered.
2.2 Investment equations
This analysis suggests the following empirical tests for the determinants of nominal investment
rates.
1st empirical formulation (EFM1)
The ﬁrst scenario originates from the deﬁnition of the nominal investment rate (6), after
imposing steady state conditions for the expression R
∗
q . Note that this formulation does not
rely on the CES production function.




β(1 + gb)−σ − (1 − δK)
−1
.
Taking logs we get the following expression:
log(s∗) = log[(δK + gb)] + log(γ∗) + log(ϕR) + log[(1 − τY )] − log(ϕq) − log(r∗ + δK), (9)
6where r∗ is the real interest rate.
2nd empirical formulation (EFM2)
In the second scenario we substitute out the value of the capital income share γ∗ as given
by (8). Taking logs we get the following expression:






{log(ϕq) − log(ϕR) − log[(1 − τY )] + log(r∗ + δK)}. (10)
3rd empirical formulation (EFM3)
In the third scenario we assume that At(xt) is determined by the stocks of public capital,
R&D, and human capital. Hence, this is an expanded version of the previous formulation.
3 Empirical ﬁndings on aggregate investment
In preparation for our empirical results, we ﬁrst go over our sample of OECD and non-OECD
countries, the available data variables that may best represent their model counterparts, and our
econometric methods. In the Appendix below we provide further details on our data sources.
3.1 Data sample
3.1.1 Countries
Our empirical exercise covers the period 1960-2000 and includes a set of 50 countries. This
group of countries has been selected on the grounds of data availability, data quality, and
geographical and economic considerations. The time period rules out some countries such as
ex Soviet Republics where data is roughly available after 1990. There are also newly-formed
countries such as the Czech Republic and those stemming from the former Yusgoslavia. Our
sample contains all countries graded A in the Penn World Table (PWT) but Luxembourg that
has a population of less than one million. It also includes all countries graded B in the PWT
but Iceland (because of population size) and Israel (high military expenditure). Singapore has
been kept in the sample, even though this country only has one ICP benchmark. After all these
considerations, we get a balanced sample of 26 major OECD countries and 24 major non-OECD
countries which are listed in the Appendix.
73.1.2 Economic variables
When it comes to the economic variables, it is important to realize some severe measurement
issues. In particular, most tax measures do not reﬂect the marginal rates required in the
model, and relative prices may not be well adjusted for quality. Measurement errors may play
a prominent role in our results below.
Notation and data sources for our variables are listed in the Appendix. Some variables in
the model like the relative price of investment and output growth are obtained from the PWT.
Other variables in the model do not have a close counterpart in the data. This is the case of
taxes and non-pecuniary distortions.
For taxes, we consider taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains (TAXIN), and taxes on
goods and services (TAXGS). As a proxy for TAXIN we also include the share of government
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (GVMC). These variables are available in the
World Development Indicators of the World Bank. For non-pecuniary distortions, we have
considered the economic freedom index (ECOF) from the Fraser Institute and the degree of
openness (OPEN) which is the ratio of exports plus imports on GDP. As stressed below, OPEN
may reﬂect country size rather than distortions.
There exits a large literature examining the role of ﬁnancial development in growth [e.g.,
King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1993)]. However, Benhabib and Spiegel (2000)
argue that these results are sensitive to the inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects. Thus, in order to
understand the role played by ﬁnancial distortions on saving decisions, we have considered the
lending rate charged by banks (LEND) and the domestic credit to the private sector (CRED).
Besides, we have constructed series for three types of capital stocks: The human capital
stock (HUM), the research and development capital stock (R&D), and the public capital stock
(PUB). All these latter variables are computed as stocks rather than as investment ﬂows.
The size and cross-country variability of factor income share has been an issue of great debate.
Gollin (2002) argues that the usual calculation of income shares fails to account for labor income
of the self-employed and others entrepreneurs. If this adjustment is taken into account he ﬁnds
that factor shares are approximately constant across time and space. Unfortunately, for many of
the non-OECD countries in our sample there is not enough data available to construct a panel
with these adjustments, thus our capital income shares are adjusted for self-employment only
8for the OECD countries. Nonetheless, our results are invariant to the choice of the data set.
Even if our factor shares are substituted by Gollin’s data, no signiﬁcant results are found.
3.2 Econometric method
Panel data techniques have become increasingly popular in growth empirics since Islam (1995)
implemented a panel data approach for studying growth convergence. More recently, Coe, Help-
man and Hoﬀmaister (2009) used panel cointegration techniques to estimate the importance of
international R&D spillovers. A panel data structure allows to deal with the problem of un-
observed time-invariant individual heterogeneity. If there are omitted characteristics correlated
with both dependent and independent variables, regression estimates may be biased. To tackle
this problem two types of data speciﬁcations are usually considered: Fixed eﬀects and random
eﬀects. In the ﬁxed eﬀect model both the dependent and the independent variables are expressed
in diﬀerences so that the time-invariant idiosyncratic regressors are removed. This speciﬁcation
is always consistent; however, if the time-invariant characteristic is not correlated with the in-
dependent regressors the random eﬀects model is more eﬃcient. In our empirical investigation
we have considered both speciﬁcations, and to choose between them we run a Hausman test.
Furthermore, we have also checked that OLS estimates for various benchmark years do not sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀer from our panel data results. Finally, to ﬁlter out business cycle eﬀects, all our
variables considered in our exercise are computed over 5-year moving averages. They are also
expressed in logs.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 EFM1: The role of income growth, capital income shares, and distortions
Our results for aggregate investment as the dependent variable for the OECD and the non-
OECD are gathered in Tables 1a and 1b respectively. EMF1 comes from equation (9) which
includes income growth, capital income shares, and distortions.
From this equation we should expect that the growth rate of output has a positive eﬀect
on nominal investment rates. This is actually conﬁrmed for both the OCDE and non-OECD
samples since Ygr is highly signiﬁcant with a sizable coeﬃcient. The positive correlation between
nominal investment rates and economic growth has been amply documented in the literature;
see Edwards (1996) and references therein.
9In (9) the neoclassical growth model predicts that an increment in the capital income share
should increase the nominal investment rate in the same proportion. Surprisingly, the OECD
coeﬃcient is close to zero and the non-OECD coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. As already pointed
out, we have tried with other sets of data, but the coeﬃcients were never statistically diﬀerent
from zero.
Regarding taxes, the evidence is also not so clear. This could also be blamed to our data
set. Taxes on income (TAXIN) should be a good proxy for taxes on capital rents but it does
not appear signiﬁcative. Indirect taxation (TAXGS) should be neutral, but it appears to have a
negative eﬀect on OECD data. Both ﬁndings go against our original model. Because the quality
of the data for TAXIN may be low, we have included government consumption (GOVC) as a
good substitute for income taxes. Again, GOVC has the expected eﬀects for the OECD group,
and has no inﬂuence for the non-OECD group. Regarding indirect taxation, as discussed later
this type of taxation will have negative eﬀects on models with diﬀerentiated inputs, but has no
eﬀect on aggregate models. Hence, we cannot discard the negative eﬀects of TAXGS, which are
only present in the OECD group.2
Finally, we try to gather the eﬀects of non-pecuniary distortions by the degree of economic
freedom (ECOF), the degree of openness to international trade (OPEN), and the ﬁnancial
variables. Mauro (1995) analyzes a set of indices of corruption in a cross-section of countries and
ﬁnds that it lowers investment and economic growth. To exploit the advantages of panel data we
use the economic freedom index. ECOF is only signiﬁcative in the non-OECD group and seems
to be a much bigger barrier for investment in less developed countries. On the other hand, OPEN
seems important for both groups. Levine and Renelt (1992) argue that the correlation between
OPEN and investment is quite robust. As already pointed out, variable OPEN may reﬂect
country size or other considerations beyond non-tangible barriers to investment. The ﬁnancial
variables, LEND and CRED, were hardly signiﬁcative or not signiﬁcative at all. Besides, the
low number of observations available for these variables conditioned the sign and signiﬁcance of
the rest of the variables and we do not report them in the results.
2The model in section 2 predicts that taxes on consumption τC have no inﬂuence on savings rates in the BGP.
Even if we introduce leisure in the model, this result still holds for the most standard utility functions. Hence,
according to this aggregate model we should not expect value added taxes to have any inﬂuence on savings rates.
As shown in the Appendix, variable TAXGS includes other distortionary taxes apart from value added taxes.
103.3.2 EFM2: The role of relative prices
The third column of Tables 1a and 1b is obtained by substituting out the steady state value
of γ∗ by primitive elements. The main implication is that now the relative price of investment
q appears in the investment equation. It can be observed that both for the OECD and the
non-OECD sample the slope estimate for q is signiﬁcant with a positive sign – higher prices
of investment lead to higher investment rates. These values can be used to obtain estimates
for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, since in equation (10) the slope
estimate for q is given by
ρ
ρ−1. Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000) ﬁnd evidence against the Cobb-
Douglas production function and in favor of an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor considerably higher than in the Cobb-Douglas case. The estimated value in our EFM2 for
ρ
ρ−1 is 0.02 in the OECD, and 0.06 in the non-OECD. This produces an estimate of ρ = −0.02
for the OECD and ρ = −0.064 for the non-OECD. Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas assumption
(ρ → 0) is rejected for both samples. However, our implied value for ρ entails a lower degree of
substitutability between capital and labor than in the Cobb-Douglas production function, but
quite close to this benchmark case.
3.3.3 EFM3: The role of external eﬀects
We consider externality eﬀects of At(xt) as embedded in the human capital, R&D and public
capital stocks. We then want to test for the potential external eﬀects that these stocks may have
on savings rates and aggregate productivity.3 Previous works have emphasized the importance
of external eﬀects coming from capital stocks; Aschauer (1989) ﬁnds evidence of external eﬀects
coming from infrastructure capital while Coe, Helpman and Hoﬀmaister (2009) conclude that
R&D and human capital have a strong inﬂuence on TFP. As already discussed in section 2,
human capital parameter Bt has no inﬂuence on the nominal investment rate. Therefore, in this
version of the neoclassical growth model, the stocks of human capital, R&D, and public capital
can inﬂuence the investment rates only through its eﬀect on At(xt). From equation (10) the
coeﬃcient attached to At(xt) is
ρ
1−ρ, which has the opposite sign of the coeﬃcient of q. Thus, if
ρ < 0 the expected sign of the A-coeﬃcient in (EFM3) has to be negative, and becomes zero as
ρ → 0. Turning to the estimates of Tables 1a and 1b we ﬁnd no evidence of external eﬀects for
3Data for the R&D and public capital stocks are limited to the period 1980-2000.
11the OECD countries and some evidence of external eﬀects of R&D for the non-OECD countries.
Human capital and public capital seem to have no eﬀect on aggregate productivity. Therefore,
the inﬂuence of external eﬀects seem to be small on investment rates. This is to be expected
if the aggregate production function is close to being Cobb-Douglas, as for this latter case the
A-coeﬃcient equals zero.
3.3.4 EFM4: Cross-country regressions for the whole sample
Finally, Table 1c reports the same exercises for the whole sample. The results are in line
with those obtained for the two groups of countries. The capital share has no inﬂuence, the
tax variables have a negative impact on savings rates while ECOF and OPEN have a positive
eﬀect. The coeﬃcient for q is positive although not far from zero. Regarding the externality
eﬀects, it turns out now that public capital decreases the savings rates which implies positive
external eﬀects on aggregate productivity. Therefore, when pooling all these countries in a single
group we get that both taxes and non-pecuniary distortions are signiﬁcative, whereas in reality
taxes matter for the OECD group, and ECOF matters only for the non-OECD group. This
is a problem of performing regressions over comprehensive country groups. We have therefore
identiﬁed certain diﬀerences between the OECD and non-OECD groups.
4 The model with equipment and structures
In order to make further progress on some of the issues raised above, we now proceed to a more
detailed modelling of the investment sector. As in the previous framework the representative
household is concerned with the optimization of a discounted stream of utility (1). The aggregate
production function contemplates external eﬀects for TFP, two types of capital, and qualiﬁed
labor:
Yt = At(xt)F(Ket,Kst,BtL). (11)
Here, Ket denotes the stock of physical capital in equipment, and Kst denotes the stock of
physical capital in structures. At all dates, output in the economy may be either consumed or
invested:
Yt = Ct + qetIet + qstIst. (12)
12The process qet reﬂects the evolution of the relative price of equipment, and qst reﬂects the
evolution of the relative price of structures. These two prices may not share the same growth
properties [cf., Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), and Gort, Greenwood and Rupert
(1999)]. Hence, we let qet = qe0(1 + ge)t and qst = qs0(1 + gs)t, for some constants ge,gs ≤ 0,
and all t.
The capital stocks, Ke and Ks, follow the laws of motion:
Ket+1 = Iet + (1 − δe)Ket, (13)
Kst+1 = Ist + (1 − δs)Kst, (14)
under constant depreciation rates, δe,δs > 0. Accordingly, we also expand the household budget
constraint to include investment ﬂat-rate taxes, τIe and τIs, and the non-pecuniary distortions,
ϕqe and ϕqs, for investments in equipment and structures:
(1 + τC)Ct + ϕqeqet(1 + τIe)Iet + ϕqsqst(1 + τIs)Ist = (1 − τY )[(ϕReRet − δe)Ket
+(ϕRsRst − δs)Kst + ϕwwt] + δeKet + δsKst + Tt. (15)
Note that Ret and Rst represent the marginal productivities of the stocks of equipment and
structures, respectively.





(1 − τY )(ϕReRet+1 − δe) + δe
ϕqeqet(1 + τIe)




(1 − τY )(ϕRsRst+1 − δs) + δs
ϕqsqst(1 + τIs)
+ (1 + gs)(1 − δs).
As is well known, inspection of these two equation reveals that for interior solutions and a
constant relative price ratio qet/qst the fraction of rental rates Ret+1/Rst+1 remains constant
for both the BGP and along the transitional dynamics. This is a simple consequence of the
postulated linear accumulation process for both types of capital as given by equations (12)-(14).
It follows that for the benchmark case of a Cobb-Douglas production function the capital ratio
13Ket+1/Kst+1 is constant along the transition. This ratio would be approximately constant for
small departures from the Cobb-Douglas postulate.
In summary, this simple model predicts roughly that investments in equipment and structures
are linearly correlated for both the BGP and along the transition dynamics. We now explore
the determinants of the ratio of these expenditures over the BGP for some CES technologies.
Hence, as before we face the choice of either letting the relative prices qe and qs stay constant
or assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function. We temporarily consider the implications of
more general technologies.
4.1 Symmetric elasticity of substitution with labor
Let us ﬁrst consider the following family of aggregate production functions:
Yt = At(xt)(α(µKε
et + (1 − µ)Kε
st)ρ/ε + (1 − α)(BtL)ρ)1/ρ.
Note that the elasticity of substitution between these capital stocks is equal to 1/(1 − ε). As
in the previous model, the elasticity of substitution between the nested capital aggregate and
labor is equal to 1/(1 − ρ).
Let γet denote that equipment income share, γet = RetKet
Yt . From the ﬁrst-order conditions
















Let set denote the nominal investment rate of equipment, set = qet(1+τIe)Iet/Yt. Imposing
the steady-state condition I∗
e = (gb + δe)K∗
e and rearranging terms, we then have
s∗






Plugging in the steady-state value γ∗


















14Following a similar procedure we obtain the nominal investment rate of structures
s∗














From these two equations we can see that the term A cancels out, and hence the level
of TFP and associated external eﬀects will have no bearing on the ratio s∗
e/s∗
e. Moreover,
substituting out the steady state-values R∗
e and R∗
s from the ﬁrst-order conditions, and assuming
no depreciation allowances for the income tax, the above two expressions become
s∗
e = (gb + δe)[qe(1 + τIe)]ρ/(ρ−1)(αµ)1/(1−ρ)Aρ/(1−ρ)

1
β(1 + gb)−σ − (1 − δe)

ϕqe


































s = (gb + δs)[qs(1 + τIs)]ρ/(ρ−1)[α(1 − µ)]1/(1−ρ)Aρ/(1−ρ)

1
β(1 + gb)−σ − (1 − δs)

ϕqs
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It follows that in the Cobb-Douglas/CES case the relative prices qe and qs do not enter into
the expression s∗
e/s∗
s. These prices are only present in the more general setting of equations
(18) and (19). Note, however, from equation (20) that the ratios ϕRe/ϕRs and ϕqe/ϕqs for the
non-pecuniary distortions are still present,.
154.2 Asymmetric elasticity of substitution with labor
There is a second family of functions in which equipment and structures do not have the same
degree of substitution with labor. It is often postulated in the literature that equipment is
complementary with qualiﬁed labor [cf. Heckman et al. (1997) and Krusell et al. (2000)]. In
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In the sequel we just present the nominal investment rates for the ﬁrst of these two production
functions. Interchanging the roles of equipment and structures one can readily compute the
results for the remaining production function.
Following the same steps as in (16)-(17), we must have
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Note that now the TFP variable A has diﬀerential eﬀects for equipment and structures. If
there are no depreciation allowances for income taxes and after substituting out for the steady-
state values for R∗
e and R∗
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Therefore, the nominal investment rate for equipment does not depend on the relative price
of structures.
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It follows that the relative price of structures does not alter any of the steady-state nominal
investment rates, s∗
e and s∗
s; only the relative price of equipment inﬂuences these rates. Moreover,
parameter A no longer aﬀects the ratio s∗
e/s∗
s.
4.3 Summary of main results
Before embarking on our empirical investigation let us gather our main results on the predictions
of this simple two-sector model:
(1) Nominal investment rates: Under a Cobb-Douglas production function nominal invest-
ment rates of equipment and structures, se and ss, are linearly correlated at the BGP and over
the transitional dynamics. This robust result holds approximately true for small departures of
the Cobb-Douglas assumption.
(2) TFP externalities: Parameter A that may involve TFP externalities is only supposed
to inﬂuence the steady-state ratio s∗
e/s∗
s in the case of asymmetric elasticities of substitution of
the two capital factors with labor, provided that the elasticities of substitution 1/(1 − ε) and
1/(1 − ρ) are diﬀerent from one and diﬀerent from each other.
(3) Relative prices: The weights of relative prices of equipment and structures, qe and qs
may uncover deviations from the Cobb-Douglas assumption, and asymmetries in the elasticities
of substitution between the two types of capital and labor.
(4) Distorsions: Taxes and specially some non-pecuniary distortions, ϕqe/ϕRe and ϕqs/ϕRs,
may have diﬀerential eﬀects on se and ss.
17(5) Economic growth: Even though economic growth has often been linked to investment in
equipment [De Long and Summers (1991)], economic growth rates gb should have similar eﬀects
on se and ss.
5 Empirical ﬁndings on nominal investment rates of equip-
ment and structures
The countries and years considered are the same as before provided data availability. For most
variables we take ﬁve-year moving averages in order to smooth out cyclical volatility. We also
make use of the panel data techniques described above.
In the national accounts aggregate investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) is divided
into producer durables and construction. Producer durables is composed of transportation
and machinery; we group these two entries into equipment investment. Construction includes
residential, non residential, and other construction; we group all these latter items into structures
investment.4
The modelling of aggregate investment rests upon the basic presumption that investments in
equipment and structures share similar statistical properties. This turns out not to be true in the
data: Nominal investment rate of equipment are not highly correlated with those of structures.
Before providing a more detailed econometric analysis, we begin with a few basic facts that we
would like to highlight. Some of these facts are known [cf., Bens (2008), Eaton and Kortum
(2001), Hsieh and Klenow (2007) and De Long and Summers (1991)], or just follow from our
more detailed analysis below: (i) As in the case of aggregate investment, nominal investment
rates of equipment and structures are hardly correlated with income levels [cf. op. cit.]; (ii)
As shown in Table 2 below, when investment in equipment is regressed against investment in
structures the slope coeﬃcient is about 0.3 for the OECD and 0.26 for the non OECD countries.
These coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and are robust to the addition of other regressors; hence, the
linear correlation suggested by our original model is not conﬁrmed by our data; (iii) When the
nominal ratio se/ss is regressed against the price ratio qe/qs we get a slope coeﬃcient of 0.09
for OECD countries and 0.2973 for non-OECD countries; these univariate correlations become
4Depending on the year and country sometimes the entries Land improvement and plantation and orchard
development and breeding stocks, draught animals, dairy cattle and the like are available. We have included
these items when possible although their size is quite small as compared with aggregate investment.
18smaller upon the introduction of other regressors (see below); and (iv) For non-OECD countries,
the relative price of structures has a very minor inﬂuence on the nominal investment rates of both
equipment and structures. These results point out at the production function with symmetric
elasticity of substitution for the two capital goods discussed above.
Our theoretical analysis of the above two-sector model suggests that external eﬀects should
play a minor role in the determinants of the ratio se/ss. Indeed, those eﬀects were also absent
in Section 3 for our empirical ﬁndings on aggregate investment, and hence they will not be
considered here. Regarding distortions, note that taxes were prominent for OECD countries,
and non-pecuniary distortions were aﬀecting non-OECD countries. We are now in a position to
analyze if these distortions have diﬀerential eﬀects on equipment and structures. Analogously,
growth has primarily been linked to some types of equipment investment [e.g., De Long and
Summers (1991)]; hence, using our data set we can check if the correlation of income growth
with nominal investment in structures is certainly more tenuous. Finally, the decomposition
of the aggregate price (q) into the relative prices of equipment and structures will allow us to
check how these prices aﬀect equipment and structures. As discussed later the relative price of
equipment is much more volatile than the relative price of structures.
Our results are displayed in Table 2 for both OECD and non-OECD countries. Note that
the dependent variable is either se or ss. As already discussed, the correlation between these
two variables in positive, but much less than one, for both univariate and expanded regressions.
Regarding the eﬀects of the relative prices of equipment and structures, they all point out to
small departures from the Cobb-Douglas assumption. As in Section 3, the aim of this exercise
is twofold; ﬁrst, we want to study how these prices aﬀect investment rates, and second we want
to explore their implications for the shape of the production function. For the OECD countries,
investment in equipment is generally aﬀected by the price of structures, and investment in
structures is aﬀected by the price of equipment but with the opposite sign. For the non-OECD
countries, the coeﬃcients of the price of structures are much smaller than those of the price of
equipment. These results suggest that for the OECD sample the relation between relative prices
and investment in equipment/structures is symmetric, leading us to the model with symmetric
elasticity of substitution with labor. For the non-OECD countries, the results are more complex,
but the signs of the coeﬃcients are not consistent with complementarities between equipment and
19labor as postulated in the above production function with asymmetric elasticity of substitution.
At any rate, these coeﬃcients are small, and hence the elasticities of substitution are close to
one.
In order to proceed more formally we performed several tests. First, equation (20) states that
for the ﬁrst family of production functions the Cobb-Douglas assumption implies that the ratio
of savings rates is independent of the prices of investment goods. In the ﬁrst entries of Table 2
we regress the ratio of investment rates se/ss against the ratio of prices qe/qs. For the OECD
the slope coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant which supports our claim, however, for the non-OECD
countries the coeﬃcient for qe/qs is signiﬁcant and equals 0.3. In all the other regressions shown
in Table 2 both samples show coeﬃcients for the relative prices of equipment and structures, qe
and qs, not too far from zero. We may thus conclude that for the OECD the symmetric elasticity
of substitution with labor and a nested Cobb-Douglas production function for equipment and
structures ﬁt well. For the non-OECD group, the symmetric elasticity of substitution still seems
to hold. Although the estimated coeﬃcients for qe and qs are not far from zero, we ﬁnd some
evidence of the elasticity of substitution between equipment and structures to be diﬀerent from
1. Unfortunately, (18) and (19) are highly non-linear, and hence it is no possible to obtain direct
estimates for ε. We can nevertheless compute a lower bound for the elasticity of substitution.
From equation (18), the relative price qs has a negative eﬀect on s∗
e. Hence, the exponents of
qs must have an overall negative eﬀect, that is,
ε−ρ
(1−ε)(ρ−1) > 0. Since one can check that ρ < 0,
it must be that ε > ρ.
More clear-cut evidence appears for the correlation between nominal investment rates and
economic growth. Both the one-sector and two-sector models sector imply that at the BGP the
growth variable gb has a positive inﬂuence on nominal investment rates. De Long and Summers
(1991) focus on equipment investment as a potentially key factor for growth. Jones (1994)
has pointed out that a negative strong relationship emerges in the data between the relative
price of machinery and economic growth, whereas the the relative price of nonmachinery enters
insigniﬁcantly in growth regressions. In Table 2 below we see that the growth variable has a
positive inﬂuence in both equipment and structures. Of course, since in our nominal investment
variables we have ﬁltered out for the business cycle component we cannot make inferences
about the timing of these eﬀects. Our previous discussion on the inﬂuence of relative prices on
20nominal investment rates attaches a symmetric role to both equipment and structures in a nested
Cobb-Douglas production function within a nested CES technology, and this symmetric role is
conﬁrmed in the empirical correlations of these two components of investment with economic
growth.
Finally, for economic policy it becomes of interest to see how distortions may aﬀect diﬀerent
components of investment. As seen from Section 3, for the OECD countries income taxes have a
weak eﬀect on investment, but GOVC and TAXGS had a much stronger inﬂuence. In Table 2 we
can see that for the OECD sample GOVC has a negative eﬀect on structures, whereas TAXGS
only aﬀects the equipment investment rate. These results may accord with common intuition.
GOVC (which has no theoretical counterpart in our model) may aﬀect public investment, which
in turn may condition investment of other types of structures. In our simple aggregate model,
indirect taxation has neutral eﬀects. But indirect taxation may have distortionary eﬀects in
models with diﬀerentiated inputs and multiple capital goods. For instance, a tax on gasoline
would have a negative eﬀect on the demand for cars. Therefore, indirect taxation may have neg-
ative eﬀects on investment but these eﬀects are not captured in our aggregate model. Regarding
the non-OECD sample, we see from Table 2 that ECOF has a positive eﬀect on investment. This
result suggests that barriers and non-pecuniary distortions seem to aﬀect equipment investment,
which is usually related to trade, technology, and innovation. Therefore, lack of property rights
and other nonpecuniary distortions may hamper equipment investment for developing countries.
These eﬀects, however, are not apparent in OECD countries.
In summary, in this section we analyzed the decomposition of investment into equipment and
structures. There is a relatively weak correlation between these two components of investment,
which is reﬂected in the slope coeﬃcients and in the reported R2 of all regressions of Table 2.
The coeﬃcients of the relative prices of equipment and structures reﬂect small departures from
the Cobb-Douglas assumption. Our variable economic growth has strong positive eﬀects for both
expenditures in equipment and structures. Taxes and non-pecuniary distortions have diﬀerent
eﬀects when considering OECD and non-OECD countries, and equipment and structures. This
may be relevant for the optimal design of economic policies.
216 Relative prices of investment goods
There is low correlation between expenditures in equipment and structures, but the data also
show a low correlation between the relative prices of equipment and structures. As is well
known from the Penn World Table [Summers and Heston (1991)] the relative price of equipment
displays much more variability than the price of structures. Regarding the relative price of
equipment, Eaton and Kortum (2001) summarize the evidence as follows: ” While the relative
price of equipment is substantially lower in rich countries, the reported price of equipment itself
is, if anything, higher in rich countries ... The ICP measure of equipment certainly varies across
countries, but the numbers do not show that it is systematically higher in the net importers
than in the net exporters.”
Therefore, the relative price of equipment in terms of consumption seems to vary because of
the variability of the price of consumption. Then, there should be a simple connection between
the relative price of equipment and the relative price of structures. The data, however, shows
that both prices are only mildly correlated. This leads us to the following question: What are
the determinants of the relative prices of equipment and structures? The question is relevant for
theories of sectoral TFP [Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Herrendorf and Valentinyi (2010)] that infer
sectoral productivities across countries from relative prices of investment. Also, the question
is relevant for policy purposes. Jones (1994) ﬁnds a strong correlation between the relative
price of machinery and economic growth. Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) attribute the volatility
of relative prices to diﬀerent barriers to economic growth, and emphasize that the disparity of
such prices will aﬀect income levels rather than growth rates.
Table 3 presents various results for the OECD and non OECD countries. As in the previous
sections all the regressions use panel data models to deal with the possible bias generated by
the existence of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
The ﬁrst two regressions of Table 3 show the slope coeﬃcients when the relative price of
equipment is regressed against the relative price of structures for both the OECD and the non-
OECD countries. The slope estimate is not signiﬁcative for the non OECD countries, and it is
signiﬁcative for the non-OECD countries but with a a value much below 1. The small coeﬃcient
may reﬂect that the relative price of equipment is much more volatile.
22We now explore the determinants of the relative prices of equipment and structures. By the
Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect [e.g.., Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964) and Jones (1994)] the relative
price of capital goods is usually higher in poor countries because in these countries consumption
goods and services are usually cheaper. Again, the eﬀect comes from the denominator of the
deﬁnition of the relative price of capital. From Table 3 we can see that the slope coeﬃcient
for Y is negative for the relative price of equipment for OECD countries, but it is positive for
the relative price of structures. Hence, within our OECD sample we obtain evidence of the
Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect for the relative price of equipment but not for the relative price of
structures. In this analysis we have restricted the sample to the OECD countries because we
presume that data quality may be an issue , but similar results are available for non-OECD
countries. The introduction of human capital conﬁrms this same result: Human capital helps
decrease the relative price of equipment but has a non-signiﬁcative eﬀect on the relative price
of structures. This story may be justiﬁed along the lines of Nelson and Phelps (1966) where
the level of technology adoption may depend on the level of education. As already pointed
out, Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), and Gort, Greenwood and Rupert (1999) report
much faster technological progress for equipment than for structures. Garc´ ıa-Belenguer (2007)
considers a two-sector growth model in which the level of human capital is assumed to have a
positive external eﬀect on the adoption of new technologies.
Besides the level of human capital, there may be other factors that can help to adopt new
technologies more eﬃciently and reduce the price of investment goods. One obvious candidate
is the level of the technology already available in the country. To evaluate this eﬀect we consider
the capital stock for R&D. We also want to evaluate the eﬀects of public investment and indirect
taxation. It is seen that R&D has a strong, signiﬁcative eﬀect on both types of capital with
the expected sign. Public capital and indirect taxation, do not have a signiﬁcative eﬀect on
the relative price of equipment. It is certainly possible for public capital to aﬀect marginal
productivities of other types of capital without having a substantial inﬂuence on their own
prices. Also, indirect taxation may leave the relative price of equipment unchanged, although in
a world of multiple equipment goods it may reduce the demand for investment. The eﬀects of
indirect taxation are only patent in the relative price of structures. Indeed, production of this
capital good uses a variety of inputs.
23Finally, reﬂecting the economic environment in this econometric study we have also included
the degree of economic freedom. Our ﬁndings go in the direction that ECOF does not appear
signiﬁcative on the relative price of equipment but aﬀects the relative price of structures with the
expected sign. Again, this is is what one would expect since investment in structures requires
domestic production over a variety of inputs.
We started this section with the basic idea from Eaton and Kortum (2001) that in account-
ing for the relative price of equipment what matters is the denominator – the relative price of
consumption. This would suggest a strong link between the relative price of equipment and
the relative price of structures, which is not conﬁrmed by the empirical evidence. Hence, the-
ories that relate relative prices with sectoral TFPs [Hsieh and Klenow (2007), Herrendorf and
Valentinyi (2010)] would have to conclude that sectoral TFPs are highly volatile across coun-
tries. This is therefore a very complex topic. Because of data availability, we mostly reported
empirical estimates for the OECD sample, and conﬁrmed the importance of certain distortions
such as indirect taxation and the degree of economic freedom. Besides, the Balassa-Samuelson
eﬀect seems only present in the relative price of equipment.
7 Concluding Remarks
Guided by the neoclassical growth model, in this paper we inquire into the determinants of
real investment rates across countries. This question is of fundamental interest for studies of
economic growth since physical capital accumulation appears to be a major factor in accounting
for income level diﬀerences. The real investment rate is deﬁned as the nominal investment rate
over the relative price of capital. Then, the analysis of real investment rates can be subsumed
into the determinants of nominal investment rates and relative capital prices.
Nominal investment rates are barely correlated with the level of income, which accords with
the basic prediction of the neoclassical model. This does not mean, however, that no other
factor can account for investment. Indeed, from our analysis of the neoclassical growth model
we can uncover certain trends. First, some factors are uncorrelated with income levels and hence
when integrated in our empirical analysis they are expected not to aﬀect the weak correlation
between nominal investment rates and the level of income. There are two major factors in this
category: Income growth and economic distortions. As suggested by our steady-state analysis
24of the neoclassical growth model, income growth has a positive eﬀect on investment. Taxes are
more prominent in OECD countries, whereas less developed countries seem to be aﬀected by
non-pecuniary distortions.
There is a second category of factors including the relative price of capital and the capital
income share that are inversely correlated with the level of income. These two forces, however,
seem to have a small eﬀect in nominal investment rates. The small eﬀect of the relative price
of capital supports the Cobb-Douglas assumption for the aggregate production function, which
entails stable capital income shares moving in tandem with nominal investment rates. What it
is puzzling is that for both OECD and non-OECD countries, capital income shares are a weak
explanatory factor of nominal investment rates.
Our paper also points out at some of the complexities involved in cross-county studies of ag-
gregate investment. First, when all countries are included in our sample we ﬁnd that both taxes
and non-pecuniary distortions aﬀect nominal aggregate investment. But as already stressed,
taxes are only relevant in OECD countries, whereas non-pecuniary distortions are only relevant
in non-OECD countries. Second, it seems surprising that expenditures in equipment and struc-
tures are weakly correlated. There must then be other forces outside our simple model that
are driving these two components of investment. We are guessing that cross-country sectoral
diﬀerences [see, however, Gollin (2002, p. 464)], as well as dynamic factors (time to build and
adjustment costs) may be responsible for these scattered patterns of investment. And third, the
relative price of equipment displays much more variability than the relative price of structures;
hence, aggregation into a single price index may actually be misleading. In our case, this type
of aggregation is not problematic because the relative prices of both equipment and structures
have a small inﬂuence on both nominal aggregate investment and on each of the two components
– equipment and structures.
Related empirical studies of economic growth on physical capital accumulation [e.g., Edwards
(1996), Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and Levine and Renelt (1992)] do not follow as closely
the analytical framework of the neoclassical growth model. We also distinguish between OECD
and non-OECD countries, and between investment in equipment and structures. From these
studies, it is not clear that additional ﬁnancial, monetary, or real economic variables have a
sizable inﬂuence on investment. Testing more general models of economic growth with monetary
25and ﬁnancial frictions and overlapping generations should be worth further investigation.
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Our sample contains all countries graded A in the PWT but Luxembourg that has a population of
less than one million. It also includes all countries graded B in the PWT but Iceland (because of
population size) and Israel (high military expenditure). Singapore has been kept in the sample,
even though this country only has one ICP benchmark.
Our sample contains most countries graded C in the PWT with two ICP benchmarks. For
several reasons, the following countries were not included: (a) Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada,
St. Lucia, Trinidad & Tobago, and Mauritius have all populations less than one million people.
(b) Benin, Bangladesh, Ivory Coast, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal do not have good
(separate) data for equipment and structures. (Although these countries have either two or
three benchmarks, the data seem good only for the benchmark years.) (c) Along the same
lines, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nepal, Swaziland do not seem to have good data for equipment and
structures separately. Nigeria and Ethiopia are not in the Barro-Lee data set, which is an input
of our human capital series. (d) Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have
been engaged in major confrontations over the period 1960-2000. (e) Finally, Bolivia, Jamaica,
Romania (data starting 1970) and Syria show very low quality in the National Accounts.
After these considerations, the following countries do comprise our sample:
(i) OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary (data starting 1970), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands,
30New Zealand, Norway, Poland (data starting 1970), Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, UK, USA.
(ii) NON-OECD countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China (data starting 1975), Colombia,
Ecuador, Egypt , Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran , Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Therefore, this is a total sample of 50 countries over the period 1960-2000 with 26 countries
that belong to the OECD. The sample keeps a balanced representation of all major economic
areas. Some further non-OECD countries could be added to this sample at the cost of lowering
our data quality demands.
8.2 Economic variables
In our empirical investigation we use the nominal investment rate and its two components,
equipment and structures investment rates. These shares are computed at domestic prices
using the data and deﬁnitions available in the United Nations National Accounts Statistics.
Equipment includes electrical and non-electrical machinery as well as transportation equipment
while structures comprises residential, non-residential and other construction. These estimates
have been taken from our previous work Garc´ ıa-Belenguer and Santos (2010) and cover the
period 1960 to 2000. The relative prices of aggregate investment are taken from the Penn World
Table 6.2 (PWT) while the disaggregated values are provided by the benchmark studies of the
International Comparison Program (ICP). They include the relative price of equipment and
structures investment with respect to output and consumption. In this exercise we use the
benchmark studies for the years 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1996.
Regarding the explanatory variables diﬀerent sources have been used. The human capital
stock and the R&D and public physical capital stocks were constructed in our previous work
Garc´ ıa-Belenguer and Santos (2010). The R&D and public capital stocks are computed as a
share of the GDP. Output per worker measured at international prices is taken from the PWT.
Many of the variables representing the economic environment and the economic policy are from
the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Although we have considered many
of the variables available in the WDI for our exercise, many of them did not turn out to be
signiﬁcant and are not reported in our regressions. Among them are the consumer price index,
31Deﬁnitions of explanatory variables.
Variable
§ Description
γ The capital income share for the OECD countries comes from the OECD statistics. For the non-OECD
countries factor shares have been computed with data from the United Nations National Accounts Statistics.
q Price of investment over price of consumption. Source: Benchmark studies (UN) and PWT.
qe Price of equipment over price of consumption. Source: Benchmark studies (UN).
qs Price of structures over price of consumption. Source: Benchmark studies (UN).
s Gross ﬁxed capital formation over GDP at domestic prices. Source: National Accounts Statistics (UN).
se Producers’ durable goods over GDP at domestic prices. Source: National Accounts Statistics (UN).
ss Total construction over GDP at domestic prices. Source: National Accounts Statistics (UN).
CRED (% of GDP) Domestic credit to private sector refers to ﬁnancial resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that
establish a claim for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises.
Source: World Develop. Indicators (WB).
ECOF The economic freedom index includes measures on the size of government, the legal structure and the
security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade and the regulation of credit, labor and
business. Source: Fraser Institute.
GVMC (% of GDP) Includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and security,
but excludes government military expenditures that are part of government capital formation.
Source: World Develop. Indicators (WB).
HUM Level of human capital. These series are adjusted for quality and have been computed with data on investment
in education constructed by the authors. Enrollment and educational systems data has been obtained from the UNESCO
Statistical Yearbooks.
LEND Rate charged by banks on loans to prime customers. Source: World Develop. Indicators (WB).
OPEN Exports plus imports divided by GDP at current international prices. Source: Penn World Tables.
Y Real GDP chain per worker (RGDPW) measured at international prices of year 2000. Source: Penn World Tables.
Ygr Growth rate of income per worker at international prices. Source: Penn World Tables.
R&D The Research and Development capital stock has been computed with data on investment expenditure on R&D
available at the UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks.
PUB The public capital stock has been computed with data on public investment available at the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook of the International Monetary Fund.
TAXGS
† (% of GDP) Taxes on goods and services include all taxes and duties levied by central governments
on the production, extraction, sale, transfer, leasing, or delivery of goods and rendering of services, or on
the use of goods or permission to use goods or perform activities. These include value added taxes, general sales
taxes, single-stage and multistage taxes (where “stage” refers to stage of production or distribution), excise
taxes, and motor vehicle taxes, and taxes on the extraction, processing, or production of minerals or other products.
Source:World Develop. Indicators (WB)
TAXIN
† (% of GDP) Taxes on income, proﬁts, and capital gains are levied on wages, salaries, tips, fees,
commissions and other compensation for labor services; interest, dividends, rent, and royalties; capital gains and
losses; and proﬁts of businesses, estates, and trusts. Social security contributions based on gross pay, payroll, or
number of employees are not included, but taxable portions of social security, pension, and other retirement
account distributions are included. Source: World Develop. Indicators (WB)
† Includes only central government.
UN=United Nations. WB=World Bank.
the exchange rate, the lending interest rate, the spread interest rate and the share of import
duties on GDP. All the variables from the World Bank WDI are introduced as a share of GDP.
The capital income share for the OECD countries is taken from the OECD statistics, for
the non OECD countries we have used data available at the United Nations National Accounts
Statistics with the proper adjustments to have homogeneous data. Finally the economic freedom
index and OPEN are provided by the Fraser Institute and the PWT respectively. A detailed
description of the variables and sources used is provided in the next table.
32Table 1a: Aggregate investment rate at domestic prices. OECD
Explanatory
variables EFM1 EFM1 EFM2 EFM3
Ygr 0.4793 0.4037 0.4842 0.5604









ECOF -0.0110 -0.0004 0.0168 0.0218











R2 0.2754 0.3450 0.3116 0.3368
t-statistics in parentheses.
33Table 1b: Aggregate investment rate at domestic prices. Non-OECD
Explanatory
variables EFM1 EFM1 EFM2 EFM3 EFM3
Ygr 0.7513 0.5758 0.5992 0.5700 0.7046





GOVC -0.0206 0.0832 -0.0046 -0.1667
(-0.1600) (1.3063) (-0.0703) (-2.0044)
TAXGS 0.4110
(1.6300)
ECOF 0.0645 0.1243 0.0470 0.0514 0.0394
(3.1528) (6.5600) (3.2233) (3.5891) (1.9093)
OPEN 0.2332
(6.4300)








R2 0.5022 0.5588 0.3365 0.3613 0.3997
t-statistics in parentheses.
34Table 1c: Aggregate investment rate at domestic prices. Whole sample
Explanatory
variables EFM1 EFM1 EFM2 EFM2 EFM3 EFM3
Ygr 0.5810 0.4996 0.5316 0.5254 0.5139 0.5394
(11.3213) (10.1932) (11.1988) (10.8946) (10.6623) (9.6718)
γ 0.0097 0.0066 0.0048 0.0025 0.0042 -0.0085
(1.5457) (1.0914) (0.8080) (0.4112) (0.7056) (-0.9766)
TAXIN 0.1068
(1.5063)
TAXGS -0.2897 -0.3039 -0.2772 -0.4013
(-3.0914) (-3.3091) (-3.0144) (-3.8259)
ECOF 0.0512 0.0605 0.0709 0.0728 0.0686 0.0576
(3.8359) (4.8717) (5.6422) (5.8928) (5.5334) (4.3984)
GOVC -0.4150 -0.3208 -0.3555 -0.3405 -0.3708
(-6.3492) (-5.1356) (-5.4816) (-5.2543) (-4.3735)
OPEN 0.1131 0.1166 0.1091 0.0529
(5.4247) (5.7100) (5.3161) (2.2847)
q 0.0495 0.0538 0.0564 0.0303







R2 0.2733 0.3499 0.3178 0.3769 0.3831 0.4212
t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 2a: Equipment and structures investment rates at domestic prices. OECD
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables se/ss se/ss se se se ss ss ss
qe/qs 0.0904
(1.3296)
qe 0.3787 0.0046 -0.0004 -0.0060 -0.0491 -0.0506 -0.0574
(4.4191) (0.6964) (-0.0637) (-0.8900) (-7.2031) (-6.9472) (-7.2545)
qs 0.1027 0.0180 0.0314 0.0334 0.0002 0.0007 0.0171
(1.3603) (3.1594) (5.2041) (5.4990) (0.0404) (0.1068) (2.4010)
Ygr 0.3396 0.2766 0.2611 0.3932 0.3556 0.3441
(7.7285) (6.0876) (5.7113) (8.4224) (7.2461) (6.4233)
ss 0.1979 0.1509
(4.3178) (3.2326)
GOVC 0.0639 0.0082 -0.4185 -0.4505
(0.9629) (0.1259) (-6.0084) (-5.9308)
TAXGS -0.4159 -0.4375 0.0156 -0.1819




2 0.2960 0.3378 0.2635 0.3245 0.3071 0.5240 0.5509 0.4632
t-statistics in parentheses.
35Table 2b: Equipment and structures investment rates at domestic prices. Non-OECD
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables se/ss se/ss se se ss ss
qe/qs 0.2973
(5.2743)
qe 0.5380 0.0259 0.0246 -0.0224 -0.0167
(5.4776) (4.0283) (3.8452) (-2.7830) (-2.0283)
qs -0.1948 -0.0145 -0.0143 0.0164 0.0088
(-2.9728) (-3.5427) (-3.4777) (3.0633) (1.6632)
Ygr 0.2750 0.2787 0.2585 0.3307
(6.7736) (6.8604) (4.9025) (6.3033)
ECOF 0.0595 0.0615 -0.0045 0.0287





R2 0.2399 0.2583 0.3903 0.3856 0.2916 0.2391
t-statistics in parentheses.
Table 3: Relative prices of equipment and structures
Dependent variable
Explanatory
variables qe qe qe qs















R2 0.5103 0.2325 0.6251 0.4658
t-statistics in parentheses.
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